


REAGAN'S BIG MISTAKE • THE ANTI-EUROPEANS

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The American Conservative

How Will Iraq Strike Back?

By Richard K. Betts



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
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CONSERVATIVE NEWS AND INFORMATION

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[SELF-DECEPTION] VALUES AND DOUBLE STANDARDS

We hear much from the neocons about American values. We are supposed to invade Iraq (and then, "the next day" Iran) they say, to promote American values. (The weapons of mass destruction rationale for preemptive war is sounding a bit strained in light of the Korean crisis.)

Of course no one opposes promoting American values. But the concept tends to break down under closer scrutiny, which is one reason much of the world hears hypocrisy when Americans talk about promoting their values. Within the United States, a criminal suspect is entitled to every sort of legal protection and a jury trial—one of the great achievements of civilization. In dealings with the outside world, the United States metes out death more indiscriminately.

The American-enforced sanctions against Iraq have killed thousands of Iraqi civilians, virtually all of them innocent. Ariel Sharon's government regularly resorts to collective punishment in its war against the Palestinians, bulldozing entire blocks of homes to punish a single terror suspect. While the ugliness of suicide bombings makes extreme Israeli measures understandable, it is worth asking why the United States has continued to allow the West Bank and Gaza occupations—the root cause of the terror—to fester so long. Why not a more forceful effort to promote American values—including, we would think, democracy and self-determination—to the Israel/Palestine conflict? No invasion would be required, just the judicious use of dollar diplomacy.

Such questions, uncomfortable as they are, underlie the likely Muslim response to an American invasion of Iraq and any subsequent effort to turn the country into a democracy. Any native of the Mideast will tell you that



Iraq is not the only regime in the region that possesses weapons of mass destruction and regularly flouts UN resolutions. The likelihood is a war against Saddam's regime will be perceived—by millions throughout the Arab world—not as a liberation but as a hypocritical effort to impose an alien regime on an Arab country, carried out primarily for Israel's benefit. Some will resist by dreaming up ways to hit back at us when and where we are most vulnerable. Americans who claim otherwise are deceiving themselves.

[POLITICAL CORRECTNESS] COLD WHITE MEN

Warning: The onset of winter may have caused you—or worse, your unwitting youngsters—to construct a sexist symbol right in your own front yard. So says Tricia Cusack, an art historian at Britain's University of Birmingham, after five years of extensive research. Writing in the *New Formation*, Ms. Cusack exposes the snowman, long considered an innocent figure incarnated by an old top hat, as a far more sinister character—"white, invariably male and generally adult." Its "mas-

culinity and its ritual position in the semi-public space of the garden or field arguably help to substantiate an ideology upholding a gendered spatial-social system marking women's proper sphere as the domestic-private and men's as the commercial public," she writes. And if patriarchal placement isn't disturbing enough, consider Cusack's revelation that the snowman's "bulbous body, phallic carrot-nose and blank, unindividualized eyes have obvious elements of the grotesque." The lone positive development: since corn cob pipes have fallen out of fashion, Frosty is saved from the further sin of endorsing tobacco use.

[NEOCONS] THE PERILS OF (SELF-) PROMOTION

Matt Drudge reports that feelings in the White House are not all warm and cuddly towards David Frum. The Canadian neoconservative is out on the talk show circuit flogging his book about W's presidency, based on his stint as a Bush speechwriter. The Bushies are evidently fearful that Frum's well-honed instinct for self-promotion, in conjunction with

his ultra-hawkish views, will complicate American diplomacy during a tense period.

Frum, as all the world knows, helped write the "axis of evil" phrase in Bush's State of the Union speech and was important in giving a neoconish tinge to the Bush presidency. As Norman Podhoretz writes, "What counts nowadays is the words a President permits to be put into his mouth" and for the neocons, the president has proved permissive indeed.

The problem is that the Bush agenda and that of neocons' are far from identical: while the latter want a wider war against much of the Muslim world (and strive to give the impression that such war is inevitable), many in the Bush administration, including, we hope, the president himself, want Saddam disarmed and contained, and the war against terror kept in focus against the terrorists who actually threaten Americans. That requires diplomacy as well as muscle. It is a sign of their wisdom that the Bushies see in the Frum book tour a potential loose cannon complicating their tasks.

[IMMIGRATION] **SHARPTON OF THE SOMALIS**

Last fall, Roger McGrath wrote in these pages about the arrival of large numbers of Somali Bantu refugees in an unlikely location: Lewiston, Maine. Now comes this update: Omar Jamal of the Somali Justice Advocacy Center of St. Paul, Minn. is setting out on a "National Tour Against Hate." High on this Somali Sharpton's list, Maine, where he will meet with the governor to discuss "hate activities in that state against Somali immigrants." According to Jamal, Lewiston's Somalis called him in October to report "hate crimes." (Of course, nothing can justify genuine bigotry, but it comes as no surprise that a

sudden mass influx of people with an alien language, culture, and religion into a homogenous small town should cause unrest.)

Having learned from the American ethnic grievance lobby, Jamal will pose for the cameras in Lewiston while calling for "understanding and tolerance."

His visit to Lewiston will be followed by a rally led by Matt Hale, founder of the explicitly racist World Church of the Creator. Just as the British National Party attempted to exploit immigration-driven race riots in the English post-industrial towns of Oldham and Burnley two summers ago, again an extremist group is using cultural balkanization for its own benefit. Such a resentful situation is not fair either to Lewiston's residents or to the Somalis.

[CULTURE] **LIGHTS OUT**

Taking up where *National Review* left off, VDARE.com has made an annual event of documenting the campaign to abolish Christmas. Nativities toppled, "Silent Night" silenced, Santa rebuked for being insensitive to minorities.

Though too tardy to compete, we offer an entry of our own: Every Christmas season since 1952, a 12-story cross created by the lighted windows of the New York Central Building has shined over Park Avenue. By tradition, it has been lighted the first Sunday in December, but this year the windows went dark after just one week. According to a spokeswoman for Max Capital, the company that owns the building, the cross was turned off as a security measure. But Charles Bierman, a chiropractor who wrote to protest, claims that Max Capital's CEO told him he was calling lights out for religious reasons. The PC proprietor failed to specify which faith was offended by the suggestion that Christmas has something to do with Christ. ■

The American Conservative

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COMPASSIONATE INDIGNATION

The essay by your correspondent J.P. Zmirak (Jan. 13), attacking the "Trotskyism" of the neoconservative movement, was skillfully written in its way, and I have no particular quarrel with its doubtless compassionate indignation on behalf of American-born black citizens.

However, in your unsigned editorial three pages earlier, you describe the victims of the Central Park "jogger" frame-up as "a pack of feral Third World youths." They seem like Americans to me, as they seemed even then. Do please advise.

CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS
Washington, D.C.

The Editors respond:

The phrase was intended ironically. Though that sentiment was implicit in the editorial, it was perhaps not clearly expressed.

FRIES WITH THAT DEMOCRACY?

J.P. Zmirak's article, "America the Abstraction," has given your readers a great deal to chew on, and I stand with him in the "un-American" column as someone whose background and faith wholly oppose much of what is deemed American these days.

To say that democracy can somehow be exported to any nation willing to buy it is like saying that American democracy has not cost what it has—that somehow we just up and inherited these great ideas apart from the reality of experience. Our life as a nation is not an abstraction. Our experience of democracy is not an ideology.

My grandfather did not watch his friends around him die in the South Pacific for an abstraction so that intellectuals could trivialize the price they paid. Let us not cheapen their sacrifice

by neatly packaging and marketing democracy around the world as an "extra value meal" that can be chosen off the menu of political philosophies and digested for a couple of bucks.

DEREK KARCHNER
Arlington, Va.

CHUA CHAMPIONED

Paul Craig Roberts owes it to Amy Chua (Jan. 13) to re-read her thesis, for while free market capitalism and democracy are intimately related, and both are closely tied to American history, culture, and institutions, this is not so in countries to which capitalism and democracy are exported. In most situations, free market capitalism and democracy are adopted as separate entities which are not complimentary but antagonistic toward one another. In such a situation, the markets favor the wealthy minority while democracy favors the majority who feel themselves oppressed by the wealthy minority. Since capitalists usually ally with the wealthy minority, they suffer a backlash against the market while the minority creates a backlash against democracy. There is a third and even worse scenario: a violent backlash against the minority peoples which leads to mass slaughter.

Nowhere does Chua suggest that globalists create market dominant minorities; however, globalism introduces itself into a pre-existing situation and makes it worse. She exposes the folly of trying to export America piece by piece with the hope that eventually our uniquely American culture will supplant an indigenous culture that has evolved over centuries.

JOHN DENTE
Wilmington, Del.

MORE OF THE SAME

Clyde Wilson makes a number of interesting assertions and useful observations in his review of *Democracy: The*

God That Failed (Jan. 13). However, he dismisses Hoppe's conclusion that monarchy is preferable to democracy as irrelevant and then asserts, albeit with some hand-wringing, that the only cure for the increasing social destructiveness of democracy is—more democracy. He reminds me of all those now forgotten books published in the last third of the twentieth century in which, after articulating awful excesses the erstwhile conservative author would develop a curious form of amnesia regarding the contents of the first nine-tenths of his own book, ending it with a lame claim that all that was needed was better mass education.

After viewing the horrific social destruction and amoral wreckage that mark the trail of liberal democratic governance's path over the past half-century, all Mr. Wilson can come up with is a wistful sigh and a call for more democracy? I respectfully suggest that none of us should hold our breath while we await yet another reinvention of Demos.

MARVIN E. OGLE JR.
via email

TRUE CONSERVATISM

I am someone with an odd mix of views (liberal on environment, women's issues; conservative on defense—imagine my conundrum during Reagan's years). I have noticed for years that the level of political dialogue has become more of an ideological free-for-all than a reasoned exchange of ideas. At present, the prevalence of right wing (I intentionally use this term, rather than "conservative") ideologues on talk radio has made their side and style of discourse ascendant—conversion rather than reason, personalizing political disagreements, applying a double standard of morality depending on one's views, etc. I miss the "old days," when conservatives took a measured, reasoned, and rational

approach to dialogue, exemplifying through their manner of discourse the principles they espoused, not tied to any one party's agenda.

Imagine how happy I was to discover your magazine. While I may not agree with many of your positions, I admire and respect the manner in which they are presented and that you remain true to your principles regardless of which party you are discussing. I will continue to read your magazine. Thanks for reminding me that true conservatism is alive and well.

ANDY KOGERMA
via email

READ THE OWNER'S MANUAL

I have just read William S. Lind's irrational rant, "Rage Against the Machine" (Jan. 13) and am astounded by the thesis that men have little or no control over the machines they operate. I have little problem with the 60 channels of garbage on my TV cable because I seldom glance at most of them. Put another way, I try not to step in droppings. I will admit that even the best of these channels are seldom of high intellectual quality, but this problem is not technology related.

The same is true of computers. As with other tools, they can be used incorrectly or expertly, for good or for evil. If "young college grads ... cannot think," the problem isn't Mr. Lind's ludicrous contention that "... they cannot think because of information, not because of a lack of it." If bank tellers cannot make change, it is not the fault of Charles Babbage, a calculator, or too much information. Such problems are caused by a lack of intellect and several years in our institutions of planned ignorance.

Mr. Lind seems to be obsessed with the term "virtual reality," but applies it, incorrectly, to TV. By definition, the "reality" part of virtual reality is under

control of the user. If Mr. Lind is trying to say that TV is manipulated by the producers, I agree, but this is also true of the written word and spoken language and is neither unique to machines nor particularly new. All information is subject to distortion, and misinterpretation due to the humans involved should not be attributed to current technology.

More often than not, our machines exhibit, in operation, many characteristics of the operator. Often this is the result of inadequate education, poor parenting, lack of discipline, incompetent schooling, low IQ, faulty assumptions, not reading the operating manual, misconceptions, or other human foibles. I've always considered myself to be master of the machines I own and operate. Mr. Lind apparently hasn't mastered this skill.

ROD SMITH
Niceville, Fla.

PAT TOO KIND

Just got the Jan. 13, 2003 issue and, as usual, *The American Conservative* is full of interesting commentary and intelligence unique to its pages. But Pat Buchanan's column, "Ariel Sharon's Shakedown" is way too conservative in describing Israel's ripoff of the American taxpayer.

A Dec. 9, 2002 *Christian Science Monitor* story notes that since 1948, in current U.S. dollars, direct payments to Israel total \$240 billion, not including another \$139 billion to Egypt and Jordan to pay for their separate peace with Israel. Other indirect economic costs of Washington's blank check support since 1973 total over \$1 trillion. If the Israel Firsters get their way with a series of wars to make the Middle East safe for Israel's monopoly on deliverable nuclear weapons and imperial expansion, future costs will include the restoration of the military draft, but don't expect the Bush-Clinton-Wol-

fowitz crowd to pay that blood tax.

THOMAS DRAKE
Munster, Ind.

GOD'S CREATURES

Until I read your excerpt of Matthew Scully's book, *Dominion* (Dec. 16), I had no idea of the extent to which we condemn billions of sentient, intelligent, emotive beings to lives of the utmost horror and pain. Certainly man's "dominion" over nature does not include subjecting other living beings to the mechanized madness of today's modern factory food farms. It's time we added the "e" to human and claim "humane" as a human behavior that reflects our image as created in the likeness of God.

DIANA ARTEMIS
Washington, D.C.

IGNORANT APPETITES

Impressive is Matthew Scully's understanding of how the human mind and conscience works. Society has become numb to feeling compassion for beings other than human. The lonely calf wandering the fields searching for its mother kindles a soft spot in many a person's heart. But chain that calf in a crate, lined up with hundreds of other calves, their fate to end up on our plates as veal picatta and all we can do is salivate. We have become a nation in which "ignorance is bliss" defines our reaction to the pain and suffering we inflict daily on animals. This book, hopefully, will open some eyes to the atrocities we excuse as research, entertainment, and satisfying our palates.

LAURA FRISK
Encinitas, Calif.

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The Apologists

After his fifth apology, on Black Educational Television, and his promise to honor Martin Luther King Day and support affirmative action forever, Trent Lott packed it

in. That was the signal for the pogrom.

From the Clintons to the Black Caucus, the Left howled that the GOP must now own up to its sins and exorcise the demon of racism that has inhabited the party soul since Nixon.

From all sides, evidence was thrown in Republican faces. Had not Reagan used the code word "states rights" in beginning his 1980 campaign in Philadelphia, Miss., the town where civil rights workers Schwerner, Cheney, and Goodman were martyred in 1964?

Had not Jesse Helms won on a racist ad showing a pair of white hands crumbling a rejection letter for a job lost because of affirmative action? Had not Bush I won the White House with his Willie Horton ad? Had not Pete Wilson won re-election as governor of California running on that "anti-immigrant" Proposition 187? Yet, rather than defend their past, Republicans reeled and groveled: "It wasn't us!" "We're not like that!" "We're modern Republicans!"

The great failing of conservatives, said Whittaker Chambers, is that they do not retrieve their wounded. But the Trent Affair reveals a greater failure. Modern conservatives are a deracinated lot, unrooted in history, unwilling to defend their kinfolk or forebears. Confronted with a charge of "racism" or "bigotry," their natural reaction is to imitate the wildebeest of the Serengeti and light out for the tall grass.

With neoconservatives, this is understandable. After all, they are transients; they never belonged to the tribe. When

the great battles of the 20th century were fought, they or their fathers were AWOL or on the other side. From the fight to kill Wilson's surrendering of sovereignty in the Treaty of Versailles, to America First in the early 1940s, to the postwar fights over Soviet subversion, to the Goldwater movement, Nixon, Agnew, and Vietnam, they were with Trotsky, Truman, and LBJ.

Thus, as the Left rewrites the history of the 20th century to make itself heroic and the Right the racist villains, neocons declare neutrality. As for Republicans, many take the attitude epitomized by old Henry Ford: "History is bunk." And who cares about yesterday?

But as Trent Lott learned, ignorance has consequences. People who never heard of the 1948 Dixiecrats before December were soon howling for Lott's head. Uneducated to think, the new generation has been conditioned to respond with precise political correctness.

But rather than apologize for its past, the Right should be demanding apologies. In World War II, liberal icon FDR appeased Stalin at Tehran and Yalta in a fashion so supine as to make Neville Chamberlain at Munich look like Stonewall Jackson at First Manassas. When his bumbling heir, Harry Truman, left office, all the nations for which Britain and America had gone to war—Czechoslovakia, Poland, China—were in the iron grip of a barbaric, anti-Christian tyranny worse than any threat Hitler had ever posed, Americans were dying by the thousands in Truman's "no-

win war" in Korea, and the U.S. government had been honeycombed with spies and traitors to such an extent—as the Venona transcripts now prove—that Joe McCarthy had badly understated his case.

Liberals today wail and whine about the "anti-Communist hysteria" and "McCarthyism" of the era, but the American people loved the pounding that Nixon, Mundt, Jenner, and "Tailgunner Joe" gave Truman, Acheson, and Marshall, and Americans repudiated the liberal squish Adlai in two huge Eisenhower landslides without a single regret.

As for LBJ's Great Society, it gave us deficits, crime waves, race riots in 100 cities, campus rampages by over-privileged brats, and another "no-win war" into which a failing, incompetent liberal establishment had plunged the United States. Between 1968 and 1988, Nixon, Agnew, and Reagan hammered the Party of Humphrey, McGovern, Mondale, and Dukakis so relentlessly that liberals now all call themselves "progressives."

Why is the GOP ashamed of this record of victory? There was nothing wrong with the tactics that gave the party those 49-state landslides. Simply because states rights were once used to sustain segregation does not invalidate that founding principle of the Republic.

Jesse Helms was right to spotlight a victim of the racist policy of reverse discrimination, as was Bush to highlight the consequences of the ACLU idiocy of Dukakis in handing out weekend furloughs to crazed killers like Willie Horton. When conservatives start apologizing for the campaigns that gave them their greatest victories, they become, as in 1992 and 1996, what Sam Francis aptly calls them: "Beautiful Losers." ■

[unintended consequences]

How Will Iraq Strike Back?

Rather than making the world more safe, an attack on Saddam could put Americans here at home in harm's way.

By Richard K. Betts


PRESIDENT BUSH SEEMS confident that his war against Iraq will be easier than his father's, or at least that we can be sure to fight it on our own terms. But why should Saddam Hussein do us that favor? The hour is late for confronting strategic confusion, but better late than never. The United States has painted itself as well as Iraq into a corner. The case for preventive war rests on two crucial errors: understating the risk that an assault on Iraq will trigger a counter-attack on American civilians, and, when that risk is admitted, conflating it with the threat of unprovoked attack by Iraq in the future.

Most Americans take for granted that if the war proves bloodier than the optimists expect, the price will be paid by the military or people in the region. If an invasion succeeds, however, Saddam Hussein will have no reason to withhold his best parting shot—which could be the release of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) *inside* the United States. Such a counterattack against civilians could make the death toll of Sept. 11 look small. Washington has done little to prepare the country for this possibility.

When administration spokesmen do admit this danger, they misread it as reinforcing their case, as if it simply demonstrates the same threat they believe requires preventive war. There is a world of difference, however, between the odds that Iraq will fight back if we strike first and the odds that Iraq will strike without provocation in the future.

The administration does not admit that if our attack triggers Iraqi retaliation, we will have brought the disaster on ourselves. It is not quite too late to ponder the Prussian statesman Otto von Bismarck's characterization of preventive war: "suicide from fear of death."

An invasion to get rid of Saddam Hussein aims to do what no government has



CHRIS HIEBS

ever done before: destroy a regime that possesses WMD. Twice before countries with WMD fought each other but only in skirmishes—China and the Soviet Union on the Ussuri River in 1969 and India and Pakistan over Kargil in 2000. In those limited clashes neither side's leadership faced its own demise. The difference this time has not been digested by pro-war strategists.

All the way through the passage of congressional authorization for war, the greatest danger a preventive assault might pose to Americans went almost unmentioned. Attention focused instead on less immediate, less likely, and less dangerous threats. The hawks' argument for war focused on the future danger that Iraq will get nuclear weapons. But the biological weapons Iraq almost certainly has already are bad enough. The worst estimates of U.S. vulnerability may be grossly exaggerated, but vulnerability is high in any case. A 1993 Office of Technology Assessment study saw the possibility of one to three million fatalities from anthrax delivered by aerosol from a single plane over the Washington, D.C. area. Even if medical readiness makes a realistic figure only one percent of that figure, casualties

retaliation. If he would cut his own throat when not provoked, he will certainly lash out with anything he has when we go for his jugular and his back is against the wall—and Washington wants him to go to the wall. Saddam will not go gently if he has nothing left to lose.

The risk that has absorbed commentators, however, is the vulnerability of U.S. invasion forces, or local supporters like Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, as if the danger is only that Iraq would set off WMD within the region. But if the military assault to overthrow the Iraqi regime succeeds, there is no reason to doubt Saddam's intention to use biological weapons where they would hurt Americans the most. Then the only question is whether he will have the capability to carry out the intent.

Maybe not. Maybe Saddam is not crafty enough to figure out how to strike the American homeland. Maybe Iraqi intelligence is too incompetent to smuggle biological weapons in and set them off. Maybe underlings would disobey orders to do so. Maybe terrorists to whom they might subcontract the job would bungle it. Maybe American forces could find and neutralize all of Iraq's WMD before they could be detonated.

on Sept. 10, 2001 that 19 Arab civilians would level the World Trade Center and tear a chunk out of the Pentagon. If the odds are as high as one out of six, they make the risk in overthrowing Saddam the same as Russian Roulette. It is one thing to hope that we can wage war to the end without triggering effective retaliation. It is altogether different to assume it, which is "best case" planning that should shame any self-respecting hawk.

Taking the current threat to heart means two big things:

First, the government has not done enough to get ducks in a row on the home front. The day President Bush kicks off the war is past time for moving decisively beyond the drawing-board phase of homeland defense, the studies and plans under development to prepare for future biological or chemical attack, and into thorough implementation. The public deserves immediate, loud, clear, and detailed instructions about how to know, what to do, where to go, and how to cope if they encounter anthrax, ricin, smallpox, VX, or other pathogens or chemicals the day after American tanks overrun Baghdad. It is too late now to do what should have been done much earlier—cut through the production problems and other complications in making vaccination against anthrax available for civilians who want it (much of the military has already been vaccinated). Putting in place and exercising the mechanisms for detecting anthrax attacks and responding quickly enough to dispense antibiotics on a massive scale are the least that a crash program should assure before we invite retaliation. Smallpox is a less likely threat, and much planning has been done for mass vaccination in an emergency, but at the least a large majority of health-care workers should receive vaccinations in advance. Until all this is done, the United States cannot be ready to start a war.

WE HAVE GIVEN SADDAM MORE THAN ENOUGH TIME TO CONCOCT RETALIATION, SINCE THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION HAS MADE THIS WAR THE MOST TELEGRAPHED PUNCH IN MILITARY HISTORY.

would be more than triple those of Sept. 11. Iraq could also have bio-engineered pathogens for which no defense is available. Chemical weapons would be less destructive than biological, but they too could exact a devastating toll.

Is Iraqi counterattack really plausible? Hawks worry that Saddam will use WMD or give them to terrorists in the future, even if we threaten him with devastating

But it is reckless to bank on maybes. We have given Saddam more than enough time to concoct retaliation, since he has been on notice for months that we are coming. The Bush administration has made this war the most telegraphed punch in military history.

Is it alarmist to emphasize the danger of Iraqi counterattack? The odds may be low—perhaps as low as the odds were

Second, late as it is, the risk of Iraqi retaliation underlines the case for reconsidering the alternative to provoking it. Why is reliance on containment and deterrence—the strategy that got us through four decades of Cold War—more dangerous than poking the snake right now?

For American deterrence to fail, Saddam would have to choose deliberately to bring on his own demise when he could otherwise continue to survive, scheme, and hope for something to turn up. Saddam's record is so filled with rash mistakes that preventive warriors believe he must be considered undeterrable. But there is no good evidence to prove the point. Reckless as he has been, he has never yet done something we told him would be suicidal.

Saddam's worst mistake was invading Kuwait, but that happened precisely because Bush the Elder did not try to deter him. Indeed, U.S. communications before the 1990 invasion gave him a green light. During the war, in contrast, American leaders did issue a deterrent threat, warning Saddam against using biological or chemical weapons. That deterrent worked.

Bush the Younger quite aptly compared Saddam to Stalin but drew the wrong lesson. Like Saddam, Stalin miscalculated in approving the invasion of South Korea in 1950 because Truman (like Bush in 1990) did not try to deter. Secretary of State Acheson had indicated publicly that South Korea was excluded from the U.S. defense perimeter. Stalin did not invade Western Europe, however, where the NATO deterrent was clear.

Is the proper analogy instead to terrorists? If the Iraqi regime is of a piece with al-Qaeda (a conflation of threats that official rhetoric has encouraged) deterrence would be impractical. But Saddam and the Ba'athists are not reli-

gious fanatics bent on martyrdom. They are secularist thugs focused on their fortunes in this world. Nor can they hide like al-Qaeda. The crucial difference between a rogue state and a terrorist group is that the state has a return address.

What makes hawks sure that long-term deterrence is more dangerous than immediate provocation? Saddam could be a greater threat in five years, but he could also be dead. He is sixty-five now, and though adept so far at foiling coups or assassination, we could get lucky.

IT IS EASY TODAY TO FORGET THAT ONCE **MAO** WAS CONSIDERED AS FANATICALLY AGGRESSIVE AND CRAZY AS **SADDAM** IS TODAY.

His stocks of WMD will grow more potent, but at what point will Saddam decide that they afford him options he lacks now, and at what point will he decide he is ready to bring down a decisive American assault on himself and all his works?

Previous briefs for preventive war have proved terribly wrong. Truman did not buy arguments for attacking the Soviet Union. Yet as Paul Schroeder pointed out recently in this magazine, "Stalin had nuclear weapons, was a worse sociopath than Hussein ... and his record of atrocities against his own people was far worse than Hussein's." Within a few years of preventive war recommendations by Navy Secretary Francis Matthews, Senator John McClellan, and others, Stalin was dead. There were numerous studies and proposals of preventive war against China in the 1960s, and it is easy today to forget that at that time Mao was considered as fanatically aggressive and crazy as Saddam is today. But by the 1970s Washington and Beijing had become tacit allies. President Bush should

think about how history could have turned out if preventive war arguments had sold in those cases.

Relying on deterrence indefinitely is not foolproof. Unfortunately, high-stakes international politics is full of problems for which the only choices are between risky options and worse ones. Americans often forget this in the era of primacy, mistakenly believing that the only problems we cannot solve are those about which we are inattentive or irresolute. Overconfident in U.S. capacity to eliminate Saddam without disas-

trous side effects, leaders in Washington are curiously fatalistic about the option of deterrence and containment, which sustained U.S. strategy through forty years of Cold War against far more formidable adversaries. Why have they lost that faith?

One explanation is psychological and moral. Many people think of deterrence as something the good guys do to the bad, not the reverse. To see the danger of Iraqi retaliation as a reason not to attack seems dishonorable, taking counsel of our fears, a wimpy submission to blackmail. It seems presumptuous of a country like Iraq to aspire to paralyze American power. It is a matter of American honor not to be deterred from suppressing evil. The cold logic of deterrence, however, has nothing to do with which side is good or evil. It is about the hard facts of capability, which should constrain the good as well as the bad.

Some also become indignant at the suggestion that an Iraqi counterattack could be blamed on American initiative, as if this is blaming the victim. This again confuses moral and material interests. If

a snake strikes back when you poke him you may blame the snake rather than yourself for being bitten, but you will still wish that you had not poked him.

Saddam has invited disrespect for his deterrent by not declaring it—as he cannot, as long as he pretends not to possess the prohibited weapons. Iraq's bugs in the basement should work like Israel's bomb in the basement—an undeclared deterrent, yet known to those who need to know. But Iraq's deterrent has not worked like Israel's; despite potentially comparable killing power, biological weapons do not instill the same fear as nuclear.

Is it too late to step back from war? It should not be, given the ludicrously amusing Orwellian doublethink exhibited by administration spokesmen over the threats posed by North Korea and Iraq. We are told that it is not necessary to attack North Korea even though its nuclear capabilities are far more advanced than Iraq's, it moves to expel UN inspectors just after Iraq accepts them, and its history of wild and crazy behavior outclasses Baghdad's.

Nevertheless, having gone so far out on the limb with Iraq, it would be an embarrassing retreat to back away. The only thing worse, however, would be to go ahead with a mistaken strategy that risks retaliation against American civilians, bloody urban combat, and counterproductive effects for the war against terrorism by mobilizing more alienated Muslims against the U.S. There are no good alternatives at this point, but there are ones that are less bad:

First, squeeze the box in which Saddam is currently contained. Selectively tighten sanctions—not those that allegedly harm civilians, but the prohibitions on imports of military materials and illicit export of oil. The way to overcome allied opposition to tightening sanctions is to offer that course as the alternative to war.



Second, continue efforts to foment internal overthrow of the regime. Saddam seems immune to covert action, but even long-shot possibilities sometimes pan out.

Third, consider quasi-war. U.S. forces might occupy the Kurdish area of northern Iraq (where Saddam has not exercised control for years) and build up the wherewithal to move quickly at some unspecified future date—to enforce inspections, to protect Iraqi garrisons that revolt against Saddam, or ultimately to invest Baghdad.

Fourth, as the noose tightens, offer Saddam safe haven if he and his henchmen step down. This would mean thumbing our nose at the International Criminal Court, but the Bush administration likes to do that anyway. There would be much clucking of tongues as a heinous criminal gets off, but better to leave open an alternative that, however bad, remains better than war.

In pondering Bismarck's line about "suicide from fear of death," it helps to recall the consequences of his replacement by leaders who saw more logic and necessity in the course he derided. Statesmen in 1914 thought they had no alternative but to confront

threats with preventive war and believed the war would be short. As often in war, expectations were rudely confounded. Instead of preventing disaster, Bismarck's successors precipitated it.

Applying Bismarck's definition of preventive war to the current case is, admittedly, hyperbole. Iraqi retaliation would not destroy the United States, and it might not even occur. But even a modest risk of tens of thousands of American civilian casualties is too high compared to the exaggerated risk that Iraq will court its own suicide by using or transferring WMD without provocation and will do so before Saddam's regime passes from the scene from other causes. Before President Bush takes the last step he should realize that consequences even a minute fraction of those of 1914 would thoroughly discredit his decision to start the war. ■

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[ugly americans]

The Anti-Europeans

Anti-Americanism has an evil twin: the neocon campaign to malign the West's other democracies.

By Stuart Reid

IF THOMAS BABINGTON MACAULAY gave us the Whig interpretation of history, Victor Davis Hanson has given us the Marvel Comics interpretation, with added Thucydides. (Hanson is a classicist and doesn't care who knows it.) For the past year, this sixth-generation grape farmer from Selma, Calif. has been writing the same piece, week after unforgiving week, for *National Review Online*. At the risk of simplifying, it goes something like this: Churchill good, Chamberlain bad; Democracy good, Tyranny bad; Israel good, Palestine bad; America good, Europe bad; Cowpokes good, Redskins bad; and, listen up, if it hadn't been for "muscular and unsophisticated Americans," you Euroweenies would now be speaking Kraut. But Hanson is not just a classicist and a grape farmer; he is also visiting professor of military history at the U.S. Naval Academy, and he knows what he wants. In the name of all that is holy and decent and democratic, in the name of Wal-Mart and Wall Street, he wants us to square our jaws, narrow our eyes, slap on the sun screen, dust off the depleted uranium, and spend \$60 billion on a war with Iraq.

All things considered, most Europeans would rather pass on this one, as Saddam Hussein has never done them any harm and intends them none; and anyway people might get killed: not Americans, perhaps, but people all the

same. Hanson finds this response repulsive. Who the devil do these Europeans think they are? Have they no gratitude? Can they not recognize "history's greatest civilization" when it is staring them in the face and asking for no more than a bit of unconditional love and maybe a spare infantry battalion or two? America offers Europe "Sex and the City" as it were and the nuclear umbrella, yet the Europeans become churlish when asked to put their lives on the line and persist in taking a negative view of Manifest Destiny.

Hanson is without doubt the best buy in Neocon City. In October, he poured out his frustration and grief in *Commentary* ("Goodbye Europe?"), but alas fell at the first paragraph: "... few things can have been more dismaying to Americans than the attitude adopted by many of our closest European allies, whose sympathy for the loss of life [on 9/11] was quickly replaced by skepticism ... toward American motives and American policy."

Be dismayed no longer, Americans. Sympathy for the loss of life was absolutely not replaced by skepticism. It was all along accompanied by skepticism. Sympathy remains in place, but (and please forgive me for going over old ground) Europeans are convinced that instead of declaring war on terrorism—a war he could not possibly win and which, after 14 months of military flascos, he is

manifestly losing—the President of the United States should have devoted his energies to hunting down and hanging the murderers and their agents.

What a bunch of wimps, eh? Almost as bad as the Canadians. No wonder Hanson's contempt for Europe is shared by many red-blooded (though for the most part unbloodied) Americans. After reading tens of thousands of words from the *Weekly Standard*, *National Review*, *Commentary*, and *Policy Review*, even *Slate*, the message I get from the War Party is that Europe—with the possible exception of Britain—is morally and intellectually bankrupt; that, having been exhausted by the wars of the last century, she is now too weak and too timid to confront major (or even minor) external threats; that she is envious of America's military might and material abundance (which accounts for all those foaming anti-Americans); and that European Union itself is "socialist" (a word used by the New Right in America to describe any nation that provides a public health service and observes the major feasts of the Christian calendar).

Europe is also, of course, venomously and congenitally anti-Semitic. To read some of the more emotional neocons—Charles Krauthammer, George F. Will, David Gelernter, and Michael Ledeen, for example—one might conclude that it is only a matter of time before "Europeans"

revert to form and, at the very least, start forcing Jews to scrub the streets. In a muddled piece in the *Weekly Standard* last autumn, David Gelernter wrote of Europe's "casual, endemic anti-Semitism, her politically, financially, and masochistically rewarding fascination with Muslim states who despise her. ..." Elsewhere in the same piece he asserted, "Europe wants to hate herself ... but not for the sin of killing Jews; for the sin of killing Europeans." And here is the snarling Michael Ledeen in NRO: "I always marveled at the Europeans' ability to praise Hitler as a man of peace, and get terribly annoyed at Czechoslovakia for denying the poor man his richly deserved peace of mind ... by existing in his *Lebensraum*."

This is spiteful and paranoid rhetoric unworthy even of the Marvel Comics school. Two points should be made. The first is that only the Nazis and their accomplices were guilty of killing Jews. "Europe" was not. Europe suffered hideously in World War II, losing many more men in the struggle to defeat Hitler—and thus to save Jewish lives—than the Americans. France lost 110,000 dead by May 1940; worldwide, between 1939 and 1945, some 60 million died, most of them civilians. The second point is that, webwise, the United States is almost certainly the most anti-Semitic—and for that matter anti-American—nation on earth. It is not just loony websites, either. On the American street, anti-Semitism is selling like crack cocaine: according to the Anti-Defamation League 17 percent of Americans—some 35 million adults—are now "hardcore" anti-Semites, an increase of 5 percent since 1998.

Actually there is a third point. Ledeen's crack about the Europeans praising Hitler as a man of peace might have had a bit more edge if he had added that Winston Churchill—icon-in-chief of neoconservatism—did not always speak ill of the Nazi leader. In

1937 he praised Hitler's "patriotic achievement" and hoped that if England were ever defeated in war she would find a champion "as indomitable" to restore her fortunes. Churchill then led Great Britain to victory in the war against Nazism. Having defeated one evil, he warned of another: Soviet Communism. He did not, however, advocate war. On the contrary, he advocated dialogue. The result: peace in our time. We did not listen to the philosopher and mathematician Bertrand Russell when in 1948 he urged a preemptive nuclear strike against the Soviet Union to prevent Stalin from developing weapons of mass destruction. (Russell went on to become an anti-American loony.) Nor did we, thank God, bomb Moscow in retaliation for the Soviet suppression of the Hungarian uprising in 1956.

THE WAY THESE FELLOWS TELL IT, AMERICA'S ALLIES ACROSS THE ATLANTIC HAVE TURNED INTO A BUNCH OF NEO-NAZI COMMIE WEENIES.

Scarcely less overwrought than Ledeen and Gelernter—and Russell—is David Pryce-Jones, a countryman of mine. In his contribution to *National Review*'s "Ugly European" issue of April 5, 1999—the cover drawing shows a Frenchman with cunning eyes, a long nose, a jutting chin, and a cigarette in the corner of his mean and unenlightened mouth—Pryce-Jones maintained that in many organizational, social, and intellectual respects the European Union is the natural successor to the Soviet Union. Blimey! The way these fellows tell it, America's allies across the Atlantic have turned into a bunch of neo-Nazi commie weenies.

Robert Kagan, author of the monumental and widely acclaimed *Policy Review* essay, "Power and Weakness," is more forgiving than many of the hawks. He would not deny that Europeans are

weak, snotty, shrill, feckless, impotent, parochial, selfish, and parasitical, but he thinks their many failings are the result of capricious historical forces rather than of moral turpitude; and that Europe is not actually to blame for luxuriating in peace while leaving it to the mighty and altruistic USA to go abroad slaying dragons. *C'est la guerre*.

"Power and Weakness" is an upright and sober work, but it runs to 11,569 words, and Kagan occasionally bumps into the furniture. For example, it is hard to square his opening remarks—that Europeans and Americans no longer share a common view of the world; that on major strategic and international questions they are not even from the same planet; and that in terms of foreign and defense policies they have parted ways, almost certainly forever—with his

conclusion that "the United States and Europe share a set of common Western beliefs. ... [and their] aspirations for humanity are much the same. ..." Kagan's opening shot was on the mark: there are indeed irreconcilable differences between Europe and the United States and always have been. Contrary evidence notwithstanding, Europe is a product of the Age of Faith; America a product of the Age of Reason.

Kagan is a great believer in Reason, provided that it leads to right thinking. In a rare moment of Marvel School candor, he declares, "Americans, as good children of the Enlightenment, still believe in the perfectibility of man, and they retain hope for the perfectibility of the world. But they ... still believe in the necessity of power in a world that remains far from perfect. ... Americans can sometimes see themselves in heroic terms—as Gary

Cooper at high noon. They will defend the townspeople, whether the townspeople want them to or not."

You can be sure that *National Review's* excitable John Derbyshire couldn't agree more, though he surely would if he could. As an Englishman who recently became a U.S. citizen, he has the zeal and credulity of a convert. To him, America is not just the sweetest fruit of the Enlightenment but the "jewel in the crown of civilization." England, by contrast, is "a feminized society drenched in sentimental hedonism." After a trip to Canada to defend racial profiling, he pronounces, "Whenever you go amongst foreigners, or read their commentaries, you realize just how far ahead of the world America is. ... this is where stuff happens." Even before he became an anti-war activist, my old friend the Okie from Muskogee would have been embarrassed by that.

But let's be fair. Not everything the neocons say is false or even ill informed. There is more anti-Semitism around now than there was before 9/11, but there is even more anti-Muslim feeling. There is also more hostility to the United States. That does not mean, however, that Europeans are anti-American. Most Europeans like Americans, though naturally some Europeans—possibly a growing number—dislike them, in the same way some Serbs dislike Albanians. What certainly does bother Europeans is *Americanism*—and what the great Jean-Pierre Chevenement called its cretinizing influence. (Incidentally, Americanism—the elevation of the active virtues over the passive—was condemned as a heresy by Pope Leo XIII in 1899.) A.N. Wilson, the conservative historian and novelist, is not fond of Americanism. Just before Christmas, he wrote in the London *Evening Standard* that if he were compelled to fight either for Iraq or America, he would fight for Iraq, since the Americanists had assumed the role of bully.

It is quite easy to see how this might set American teeth on edge and make American taxpayers resent the billions they are spending maintaining a military presence in Europe. The neocons are right when they say that Europe should either pay up or shut up, but do they mean what they say? It is precisely the neocons—both in the United States and in Great Britain—who have been most contemptuous of the European Rapid Reaction Force. The last thing that the liberal imperialists of the Anglo-American Right want is a militarily independent Europe. Yet to any self-respecting European, reliance on the United States for defense is indefensible and stupid. The European Union should pay whatever it costs to protect her borders and, if it should come to that, to resist the United States.

But the question remains: why are the neocons so mad at Europe? The anti-Semitism that is allegedly swamping the Continent cannot be the answer, except in the minds of the more loopy Zionists. Nor can Europe's supposed envy of the United States. It does not exist except among pathologically pro-American beauty consultants and self-employed plumbers in Essex. What is to envy? East Texas? No, the answer is that neocons fear Europe. Why else would they get so angry about a continent that they profess to believe is impotent? Why, if the United States is mortally threatened by a two-bit mass-murderer in the Middle East, should the hacks of the New Right—and with them the administration—give a damn about what the Europeans think? Why don't they forget Europe, forget the UN, and do the right thing and kill Saddam? It would be a morning's work. What's stopping them? What's frustrating the best laid plans of Richard Perle and Paul Wolfowitz and Dick Cheney (not to mention Andrew Sullivan and the White House attack monkey Jonah Goldberg)? To many on this side of the

Atlantic, it looks as though the administration is scared, not physically perhaps, but politically.

If Bush does not go to war, he loses face (and therefore votes). But if he stands and fights he risks losing the support of the 60 percent of Americans who do not believe that he has made the case for war. Some of us are wondering, therefore, whether he might not continue to procrastinate and, after cutting a relatively bloodless (but profitable) deal in the Middle East, declare a famous diplomatic victory. It is that possibility that goes some way to explaining why the neocons hate Europe. They do not want diplomatic victories. They want military victories. Some of them have been lusting after a war with Iraq since Sept. 12. Now they fear that Europe—or at least European and Third World voices within the UN—will somehow snatch it from them.

Maybe they should not be so anxious. The smart money in London, as in Washington, is still on war. In the weeks immediately before Christmas, Europe began to seem less intransigently European. The expansion of EU to the borders of the former Soviet Union, in tandem with the expansion of NATO, is likely to strengthen Washington and weaken Brussels. If Valéry Giscard d'Estaing's brave and principled warnings are ignored and Turkey comes on board, then the United States of Europe will become the Europe of the United States, and there will be no insubordination the next time America wants to war-war rather than jaw-jaw (which will be soon). That is not good news for neo-Nazi commie weenies. Those of them who are not prepared to straighten up and fly right will have to move to Canada—if there is still such a place. ■

Stuart Reid is deputy editor of the London Spectator.

[reassessing the right's hero]

Ronald Reagan's Big Mistake

Immigration policy could have been reformed before we hit the crisis point, but the Gipper blinked.

By Otis L. Graham Jr.

ON SEPT. 11, 2001, one of the hidden and shockingly high costs of America's immigration policies was put on the books. Porous borders and governmental abandonment of virtually all interior controls had allowed terrorists to glide easily in and out of the country for periods of their choosing, as they trained in this affable society for their suicide missions against it.

Those who threw out the national origins system in 1965 and liberalized U.S. immigration law had repeatedly assured the public that they were making no changes that would result in larger numbers or a shift in source countries. But they had done both. Source regions shifted from Europe to Latin America and Asia. Annual totals of legal immigration, which had averaged 178,000 (with considerable yearly fluctuation) over the duration of the national origins system of the 1920s, rose to 400,000 by 1973, to 600,000 by 1978, reaching one million by 1989. An unknown number of illegal aliens—the official estimate in the 1980s was 200-500,000—were thought to be entering the country annually, while apprehensions along the 2,000-mile Mexican border reached a half-million by 1970 and topped one million by 1977—an “invasion,” in the word of INS Commissioner Leonard Chapman. The impression of a border out of control was enhanced across the 1970s by

bursts of refugee landings from Cuba and Haiti, over 550,000 refugees from southeast Asia following American withdrawal from Vietnam in 1974, and a large flow of migrants asking asylum from civil wars in El Salvador and Guatemala.

There have been few occasions since 1965 when the system might have been successfully challenged and reformed toward lower numbers, toward a different system of selection, and the maintenance of effective border and interior controls. Ronald Reagan was in office when the first opportunity for reform arose. Where immigration is concerned, because it builds its own constituencies, there is often not a second chance.

Immigration reform was not a Reagan sort of issue. Like other Americans born on the eve of World War I, he took on his political outlook in the mid-century decades (and, in Reagan's case, in small-town Illinois settings) when large-scale immigration and the issues it raised had been ended by the restrictionist reforms of the 1920s. One is thus not surprised to find nothing on immigration in Reagan's autobiography, *Where's The Rest of Me?* As California governor for eight years, he continued the political tradition of ignoring immigration, despite its impact on the Golden State, since it was a federal responsibility and the state had problems of its own. And in the election of 1980, immigration never came up,

though the media had been full of public agitation over the flow of illegals over the Mexican border and the unauthorized refugee landings from Cuba and Haiti.

Reagan did have a place in his mind and a rhetoric on the matter of immigration. His was the sentimentalist, Statue of Liberty conception so widely shared among assimilated Americans of his day who could not remember when immigration had been a problem. In one of the few references to immigration in his published state papers covering his eight years in the White House, Reagan displayed in 1984 the then-dominant language of diversity celebration when he told an audience of naturalizing immigrants that immigrants “enlivened the national life with new ideas and new blood,” and “enrich us” with “a delightful diversity.”

So immigration control for Reagan in the 1970s and 1980s had no attraction as an issue appropriate for policymaking or, as Reagan usually preferred, policy unmaking. It was one of those positive buttons politicians push before the right audiences. He never responded sympathetically to an entirely different view growing among Americans of a “border out of control,” nowhere more than in California.

Reforming immigration policy fell to Reagan after fumbling attempts at

reform by the Carter administration, and another Republican might have seen it as a way to criticize liberals. But the issue was fundamentally at odds with Reagan's entire political purpose and temperament. He was interested in shrinking government, and here was a case in which government was charged with not doing enough on an issue of law and order with a natural resonance among Republicans. Presidential leadership in this area could only mean making the government larger, and that was not Reagan terrain.

As Reagan took office, the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, chaired by Notre Dame President Theodore Hesburgh, reported with recommendations for sweeping policy change, especially geared to reducing illegal immigration. Editorials in the nation's major newspapers supported these proposals. Congressional action was sure to follow, and the executive branch had no choice but to participate in the framing of laws it would be expected to enforce. Nicholas Laham, the only historian to undertake a book-length assessment of Reagan's relationship with the immigration issue, describes the White House as "wary on the subject," for which the new administration had "only a marginal priority."

In May 1981, Alan Simpson (R., Wyo.), chairman the Senate subcommittee on immigration, sought to confer with the president prior to Reagan's scheduled meeting with Mexican President Lopez Portillo in order to urge the administration to keep American options open on immigration. But the meeting lasted only 15 minutes. Reagan listened to Simpson's views and limited himself to a broad promise of co-operation. Congress therefore assumed the lead in immigration reform, though Simpson, in the words of a White House staff memo to Reagan, had "indicated his willingness to 'carry the administration's water"

on this issue." They carried different water, as it turned out.

Simpson sensed from his early contacts with White House aides that co-operation with Reagan was shaky. To start with, the president's newly appointed Immigration Task Force was leaning toward an expansion of legal immigration. One important bias appeared to shape the Task Force's deliberations from the start. In the words of one White House staffer, "The President is himself a firm believer in a high degree of freedom in immigration," and other top aides supported this orientation. A memo from White House Chief of Staff James A. Baker and Counselor to the President Edwin Meese concluded that "immigration is a no-win" issue.


IN THE WORDS OF ONE WHITE HOUSE STAFFER, "THE PRESIDENT IS HIMSELF A FIRM BELIEVER IN A HIGH DEGREE OF FREEDOM IN IMMIGRATION."

On July 1, 1981, a 26-page Task Force report went to Reagan. Issues surrounding illegal immigration dominated the report and generated internal divisions that remained unresolved. The Task Force had reached agreement to make a large part of the problem of illegals simply disappear through an amnesty, though the details of this were in dispute. And it agreed to make more future illegals disappear by admitting them as legal guestworkers in agriculture. But there was no final agreement on the proposed employer sanctions provision, let alone whether it should be enforced through a national identity card. Later that month, Reagan presided over at least one Cabinet meeting to resolve intra-administration differences. While Cabinet meeting minutes have not been opened for research, Assistant to the President for Policy Development Mar-

tin Anderson has provided in his memoir an account of this crucial July Cabinet meeting where the immigration reform project inside the administration was emasculated (in Anderson's view, cleansed of a very bad idea). At this meeting Attorney General William French Smith presented the Task Force proposals, including the idea inherited from the Select Commission of "an improved Social Security card" to help employers determine legal residency. After the mention of an identification card—we are not sure of the Attorney General's actual wording—there was silence. Then Anderson, in his account, rallied the real Reagan anti-government faithful, suggesting that it would be cheaper to "tattoo an identification number on the inside of everybody's

arm." Secretary of Interior James Watt at once pointed out that this brought to mind the Biblical "Mark of the Beast." The image of Nazi concentration camps was in the air. Reagan was aroused and made his contribution. "Maybe we should just brand all the babies," he smilingly proposed, getting into the swing of bad analogizing.

Whatever happened in this July meeting, it was effectively the end of the administration's receptivity to beginning the national experiment with a single counterfeit-resistant identifier. Getting wind of the decision, the *Washington Post* criticized the Cabinet for abandoning the "new and less easily forged Social Security card" and declared that "the test of any administration's determination to confront the problem seriously becomes a willingness to devise some national identifier," as recom-



The administration, agreed that there were problems. Attorney General Smith declared "Current laws and enforcement procedures are inadequate—particularly with regard to illegal aliens and mass requests for asylum." But the administration's proposals opened the borders more than firming them. The principal recommendations were 1) sanctions on employers knowingly hiring illegals, enforced through reliance on existing documents (the administration "explicitly opposed" a national identity card or system); 2) an "experimental" guestworker program admitting up

Immigration Reform, James Gimpel and James Edwards argue that a political opportunity may have been lost at this early stage. Immigration issues, formerly without clear partisan configuration, had under the pressure of the mass refugee and illegal alien flows of the late 1970s taken on in the early Reagan years a partisan alignment. Some Republican politicians, formerly with no interest in or position on immigration, found that flows of Third World immigrants expanded the welfare state and angered their constituents who faced growing local social welfare costs. In this view, a restrictionist Republican complaint-issue was emerging, but the Reagan administration did not recognize it.

Reagan was in the White House during one of the only two occasions in the last three decades of the century in which illegal immigration so vexed the national mind that serious reform was not only intensely discussed but a legislative result could have been produced. He allowed that opportunity to pass, though he probably did not recognize the import of that decision. The administration's brief period of leadership had taken the form of a retreat, and it would now stand mostly on the sidelines. "The focus on immigration reform definitely shifted to Congress and remained there," wrote historian Thomas Maddox.

On March 17, 1982, Simpson and Romano Mazzoli (D.-Ky.) introduced the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA). After a tortuous passage through Congress, in which its provisions were continuously watered down and its scope narrowed, the legislation was signed by Ronald Reagan in 1986. IRCA granted amnesty to illegal aliens in return for sanctions on those who hired illegally—sanctions that ultimately proved without teeth. Never considered satisfactory by immigration reformers, the legislation signed in 1986 did next to

mended both by the Select Commission and the Attorney General's Task Force. "The cosmetic substitute of requiring workers and employers merely to sign a piece of paper ... is meaningless ... Only the president himself can rescue [this] ... critical component ..." The newspaper was not alone in sensing a pivotal issue and turning point. "Sanctions won't work without it [the national identity card]," Simpson immediately declared, promising to restore the essential element in hearings. "We'll consider everything but tattoos." The president did not rescue this component. The Justice Department on July 30 put forward the administration's immigration proposals. The president simultaneously issued a short statement of his own.

If observers had expected a conservative government to shift the policy options toward firmer law enforcement while condemning liberal laxity, they were surprised.

to 50,000 Mexicans to work in sectors of agriculture where it appeared that American labor was unavailable; 3) a grant of amnesty for illegals in the country prior to Jan. 1, 1980. In short, the Reagan administration merely offered a softer, more expansionist version of the Carter administration's recommendations, with a new "experimental" guestworker program added.

Reagan's own short message announcing these proposals could have been written by Ted Kennedy. He began with the ritual incantation that "Our nation is a nation of immigrants" which would always welcome more to our shores. But the "Cuban influx to Florida" required more effective policies that will "preserve our tradition of accepting foreigners to our shores, but to accept them in a controlled and orderly fashion ... consistent with our values of individual privacy and freedom."

In *The Congressional Politics of*

nothing in the long run to stem illegal immigration.

Had President Reagan committed himself to "fixing" the immigration problem, he might have made great progress in the early 1980s. Recalling that Simpson and Mazzoli in 1981-82 proposed to reform both legal and illegal immigration, the Smith Task Force could have helped "carry Simpson's water" by addressing at least the most glaring of the flaws in legal immigration that were vexing the public at this time of unprecedented refugee and asylum pressures from the Caribbean and Central America. Gempel and Edwards present evidence that many conservative Republicans in Congress had recently come for the first time to see refugee flows and illegal immigration as "redistributive policy," bringing into the country large numbers of impoverished and unskilled foreigners who would swell the welfare rolls. Broad immigration reform appeared ripe to become a popular Republican issue.

RONALD REAGAN CALLED HIMSELF A CONSERVATIVE, BUT ON IMMIGRATION, HE WAS NOT, AND NEITHER WERE THOUSANDS OF REPUBLICAN OPERATIVES HE INSTALLED TO IMPLEMENT HIS REVOLUTION.

Had the Reagan administration not squandered the available political and policy opportunities, a strong stand against amnesty would have had considerable support in Congress and, more so, with the public. If this fight had been made and the package had not cleared the House before the 1984 election, the president could have made the obstructionism of Tip O'Neill, Walter Mondale, and the Democrats an issue before an electorate strongly supportive of effective border control. After Reagan was re-elected, effective immigration reform would have come with his mandate.

More important, the Republican Party would have chosen the right, winning voice on immigration, marginalizing its open-border wing.

This scenario is not airtight. Even if we imagine Reagan taking a leadership role on an issue he disliked, it fails to reckon with the deeper forces at work upon the American political system. Democracies in the West demonstrably could not cope with the massive immigration pressures that began to build globally in the 1960s and that promise for at least another century to wash uncontrollably from south to north. Politicians in the West, most especially in the U.S., have feared to make immigration restriction an issue, lest the backlash of a swelling pool of ethnic voters cost more than is gained from the diffuse approval of an ambivalent public.

Ronald Reagan called himself a conservative, but on immigration, he was not, and neither were thousands of Republican operatives he installed in places where they could implement his

revolution. The Republican Party had two souls, one devoted to law and order and respect for the institutions of family, church, and nation; the other and more animated one steering not by those cautious and preservative instincts but by a libertarian, free-market, government-hating ideology. The latter quickly understood that immigration reform meant strong government somewhere, so with religious conviction they moved quickly from a total lack of interest in the subject to vigorous opposition. This struggle for the soul of the Republican Party did not last long because Ronald

Reagan's heart was not with the conservatives, but with the rightist ideologues.

Indeed, the reality was more startling. Reagan swam comfortably in a sea of liberalism. Yale law professor Peter Schuck has argued that the 1980s produced expansionist policy changes despite much public sentiment in the opposite direction: the genuflection to "diversity," universal humanitarian principles of human rights, a muddled notion that global free labor markets offer a sort of economic free lunch, and the idea that national sovereignty is obsolete.

So it came about that President Reagan, and those who shared his gut-level sentiments that immigration policy should be decided with reference to core beliefs in weak and frugal government and sunny California optimism, kept the nation on the road the Democrats put them on with the Immigration Act of 1965 and subsequent lax policing of borders. That road amounted to what Harvard sociologist Christopher Jencks has called "a vast social experiment of the kind that Republicans normally detest." Liberal Democrats, whose mission it is to launch social experiments, sent down the rails in the '60s this vast social experiment in essentially open borders and fought off ill-focused efforts by conservative Republicans in the '80s and '90s to question and slow it. On this issue, conservative Ronald Reagan, in a moment of critical import, lined up with the liberals, and his historical reputation should reflect this. ■

Otis L. Graham Jr. is professor emeritus of history at the University of California at Santa Barbara. This piece is adapted from an essay that will appear in The Reagan Presidency, edited by W. Elliot Brownlee and Hugh Davis Graham, to be published fall 2003 by University Press of Kansas. Used by permission.

[prosperity paradox]

Little Boxes Made of Ticky-Tacky

First they homogenized the milk—then the countryside.

By Fred Reed

IT IS FASCINATING, when it isn't just depressing, how often the things people want lead to exactly the things they don't want. The other day I was reading G. Gordon Liddy's book of conservative nostalgia, *When I Was a Kid, This Was a Free Country*. He paints a sunset picture of former times when America was free, farmers could fill in swamps without violating wetland laws, and guns were just guns. People were independent, had character, and made their own economic decisions. The market ruled as it ought, and governmental intrusion was minimal.

The picture is accurate. I lived it. I wish it would come back, but it won't. That was a world certain to kill itself. I wonder whether Mr. Liddy understands this—that the freedom he craves leads inevitably to the modern world he, and I, detest. The problem is the fundamental difference between a farmer's filling in a swamp on his land and a remote corporation's buying of the entire country for purposes of its own and not the nation's benefit. Both are exercises in economic freedom.

What happens is that, in an independent-minded rural county full of hardy yeomen, the density of population grows, either nearby or at distant points on each side. A highway comes through because the truckers' lobby in Washington wants it. Building a highway is A Good Thing, because it repre-

sents Progress and provides jobs for a year.

It also makes the country accessible to the big city fifty miles away. A real estate developer buys 500 acres along the river from a self-reliant, character-filled owner by offering sums of money that water the farmer's eyes.

First, 500 houses go up in a bedroom suburb called Brook Dale Manor. A year later, 500 more go up at Dale View Estates. This is A Good Thing, because the character-filled independent now-former farmer is exercising his property rights and because building the suburb creates jobs. The river now looks ugly as the devil, but worrying about that is for wackos.

At Safeway corporate headquarters, the new population shows up as a denser shade of green on a computer screen, and a new supermarket goes in along the highway. This is A Good Thing, exemplifying free enterprise in action and creating jobs in construction. Further, Safeway sells cheaper, more varied and, truth be known, better food than the half-dozen mom-and-pop stores in the county, which go out of business.

Soon the mall men in the big city hear of the county. A billion-dollar company has no difficulty in buying out another character-filled, self-reliant farmer who makes less than \$40,000 a year. A shopping center arrives with a Wal-Mart. This

is A Good Thing, etc. Wal-Mart sells everything—cheap.

It also puts most of the stores in the county seat out of business. With them go the restaurants, which no longer have the walk-by traffic previously generated by small shops. With the restaurants goes the sense of community that flourishes in a town with eateries and stores and a town square. But this is gronola philosophy, appealing only to meddlesome lefties.

K-Mart arrives, along with, beside the highway, McDonald's, Arby's, Roy Rogers, and the other way stations en route to coronary occlusion. Strip development is A Good Thing, because it represents the exercise of economic freedom. The county's commerce is now controlled by distant behemoths to whom the place is a pin on a map.

This is A Good Thing. The jobs in these outlets are secure and comfortable. The independent, character-filled frontiersmen are now low-level chain employees, no longer independent because they can be fired. Their new circumstances illustrate the rule that centralized power trumps rugged individualism every time. The local control of the past existed not because of the American character but because technology did not yet allow centralization.

A third suburb, Brook Manor View Downs, appears. The displaced urbanites in these eyesores now outnumber

the character-filled etc. They are also smarter, have lawyers, and organize. They quickly come to control the government of the county.

They want city sewerage, more roads, schools, and zoning. The latter is not unreasonable. In a sparsely settled county, a few hogs penned out back and a crumbling Merc on blocks do not matter. In a yuppie ghetto of quarter-acre manors, they do. Next come leash laws and dog licenses. The boisterous clouds of floppy-eared hounds turn illegal.

Prices go up, as do taxes. But the profits of farming and commercial crabbing in the river do not go up. The farmers and fishermen are gradually forced to sell their land to developers and to go into eight-to-fiving. Unfortunately you cannot simultaneously be character-filled and independent and be afraid of your boss. A hardy self-reliant farmer, when he becomes a security guard at The Gap, is a rented peon. The difference between an independent yeoman and a second-rate handyman is independence.

People make more money and buy houses in Manor Dale Mews but have less control over their time and so no longer build their own barns, wire their houses, and change their own clutch-plates. Prosperity is A Good Thing. Its effect is that the children of the hardy yeoman become dependent on others to change their oil, fix their furnaces, and repair their boats.

The new urban majority are frightened by guns. They do not hunt, knowing that food comes from Safeway and its newly arrived competitor, Giant. They do not like independent countrymen, whom they refer to as rednecks, grits, and hillbillies. Hunting makes no sense to them anyway, since the migratory flocks are vanishing with the wetlands.

Truth be told, it isn't safe to have people firing rifles and shotguns in what is

increasingly an appendage of the city. The clout of the newcomers makes it harder for the locals to let their weapons even be seen in public. The dump is closed to rat-shooting.

The children of the hardy rustics do not do as well in school as the offspring of the come-latelys and are slowly marginalized. Crime goes up as social bonds break down. Before, everyone pretty much knew everyone and what his car looked like. Strangers stood out. Teenagers raised hell, but there were limits. Now the anonymity of numbers sets in. There's no community any longer.

And so the rural character-filled county becomes another squishy suburb of pallid yups who can't put air in their own tires. The rugged rural individualists become cogs in somebody else's wheel. Their children grow up as libidinous mall monkeys drugging themselves to escape boredom. The county itself is a hideous expanse of garish low-end development. People's lives are run from afar.

What it comes to is that the self-reliant citizen's inalienable right to dispose of his property as he sees fit (which I do not dispute) will generally lead to a developer's possession of it. The inalienable right to reproduce will result in crowding, which leads to dependency, intrusive government, and loss of local control.

I'd like to live again in Mr. Liddy's world. Unfortunately it is self-eliminating. Freedom is in the long run inconsistent with freedom, because it is inevitably exercised in ways that engender control. As a species, we just can't keep our pants up. But it was nice for a while. ■

Fred Reed's writing has appeared in the Wall Street Journal, Washington Post, Harper's, and National Review, among other places.

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Arts & Letters

FILM

[*The Two Towers*]

Realizing Tolkien's Genius

By Steve Sailer

WHEN I WAS 11, I received J.R.R. Tolkien's *Lord of the Rings* trilogy as a present and soon spent every possible hour reading it. My father eventually got tired of me evading all my chores, so, when I was halfway through the second book (*The Two Towers*), he hid it.

Months later, I found it, but by then my spell was gone. For whatever boyish reason, I never again opened the books up and soon forgot everything. So I represent the extreme of one audience for the movie version—I am the perfect ignoramus who can't tell Saruman from Sauron.

When I heard that the film of *The Two Towers* is broken into three intercut storylines that follow the survivors of the fellowship, I expected to be befuddled by the intricate but awkward-sounding plot.

The handsome human, the elegant elf, and the droll dwarf go help a human kingdom called Rohan fight an onslaught of super orcs sent by Saruman (or maybe Sauron).

Meanwhile, the hobbits Frodo and Sam are wandering through the wilderness with the Ring, where they are pestered by Gollum, a hairless little creep with a split personality.

Meanwhile, two other hobbits, Merry and the one who isn't Merry, spend most of the three-hour running time riding

around in some kind of talking tree as it, uh, lumbers through the forest that Sauron (or maybe Saruman) is chopping down.

Perplexing as it sounds, it becomes transparent in the hands of director Peter Jackson, who has to be one of the greatest cinematic storytellers ever. Even I could follow the story. In fact, within the first four minutes, I was enthralled. Remarkably, this sequel seems more self-contained, more self-sufficient than the original movie. (Credit also should go to the little known film editor D. Michael Horton, who appears to have worked only in New Zealand.)

George Lucas should beg Jackson to save his "Star Wars" franchise by directing the Episode III installment for him.

As the kingly human Aragorn, the 40-year-old Viggo Mortensen confirms himself, after a long and perhaps frustrating apprenticeship, as a top-tier leading man.

The computer-generated Gollum raises a metaphysical question that the academy needs to answer before voting for Best Supporting Actor nominations begins. Andy Serkis, who provides Gollum's voice, also acted out the role for the digital animators. Since Gollum steals the show, should Serkis be eligible for an Oscar?

What about the other audience—the cognoscenti who know Eomer from Eothain? Fortunately, I can give you an expert's opinion, because I went to the screening with Jerry Pournelle.

In some of his careers, Dr. Dr. Pournelle (as the Germans would call him) picked up two Ph.D.'s, served as the Air Force's private Dr. Strangelove forecasting nuclear war fighting capabilities, was deputy mayor of Los Angeles, helped write President Reagan's famous Star Wars speech, and carried out some

undercover spook stuff I can't tell you about. Jerry is also a best-selling novelist of hard science-fiction (*The Mote in God's Eye*) and fantasy (*The Burning City*), both with Larry Niven.

"The Two Towers" left Jerry awe-struck. As a fantasy plot craftsman and Tolkien-lover, he was impressed by how Jackson and Co. altered Tolkien's story just enough to make a tremendous movie out of it, yet no more. "I think they could not have done it any other way," he commented.

Further, he admired how the film caught two sides of Tolkien's worldview: the cold grandeur of the Scandinavian and Finnish myths Tolkien studied vs. the merciful warmth of the Catholicism he professed. Nor does Jackson try to modernize the arch-hereditary politics of the trilogy, where blood will always tell.

The main failing of both movies is that Jackson's interests are too techno-contemporary to do justice to Tolkien's very English Tory/hippie love of farms and forests. "After reading Tolkien, I knew I had to move to the country," said Robert Plant of Led Zeppelin, whose "Ramble On," with its alternating folk melody verses and hammer of the gods heavy-metal choruses evokes both Tolkien's English and Nordic sides.

In contrast, while Jackson is superb with the video game violence of the battle of Helm's Deep, his plotline of the talking tree lamenting to the two minor hobbits the destruction of the woods is not up to rest of this movie, just as the pastoral opening in the Shire got "The Fellowship" off to a slow start.

Rated PG-13 for epic battle sequences and scary images. Parents should take the PG-13 rating quite seriously. There is nothing vulgar in the movie, but I took my 9-year-old to see the first film because he had just read Tolkien's

Hobbit and was well into *The Fellowship of the Ring*. That film, however, terrified him, and he stopped reading the trilogy. Now, he is 10, but he doesn't want to see the new movie. ■

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[*Confessions of a Dangerous Mind*]

The Father of Reality TV

IT IS REMARKABLY HARD to make a good movie. As evidence, consider that Charlie Kaufman, author and main character of the delightful "Adaptation," is today's hottest screenwriter—yet, two out of his three films this year misfired.

Do you remember Kaufman's "Human Nature" from last spring? I don't. According to the invaluable Internet Movie Database (imdb.com), it earned tepid reviews and a mere million box-office bucks. And Kaufman's new "Confessions of a Dangerous Mind"—a quasi-biopic about TV game show pioneer Chuck Barris that opened New Year's Eve in Los Angeles and New York and Jan. 10 nationwide—is strangely forgettable.

"Confessions" isn't bad. It packs plenty of star power as George Clooney, Julia Roberts, and Drew Barrymore contribute major supporting roles. Indie film actor Sam Rockwell competently plays Barris as an archetypal backstage hustler.

Clooney directs the actors ably and, for a first time director, delivers a lot of visual panache. For example, Clooney shoots Barris's early years to look like the hand-colored photos from very old *National Geographic*s.

The only problem with "Confessions" is that Kaufman failed to give the movie a reason to exist.

Barris was an energetic Jewish kid from Philadelphia with shallow but broad talents. He wrote the 1962 hit song "Palisades Park" and a best-selling novel as he erratically worked his way

up the ladder in daytime television.

Barris's history-changing insight, the E=MC-squared underlying half of what is on TV these days, is that enormous numbers of salt-of-the-earth Americans desperately want to be on television. Any kind of television. Even Barris's shows: "The Dating Game," "The Newlywed Game," or—why not?"—"The Gong Show."

This must drive the privacy advocates at the American Civil Liberties Union to despair. They slave away to help us keep the tiniest details of our lives secret from prying eyes. Yet, what half of America really wants—privacy be damned!—is to be recognized by strangers on the street as the reality TV contestant who vomited while trying to eat a slug or who punched his Mom on a talk show for toilet training him badly.

I watched "The Dating Game" regularly in the 1960s. Granted, I was a particularly naïve child, but I didn't realize until now just how off-color the jokes were. (Still, that surprise was nothing compared to the one I received recently when, for the first time since I was a 10, I saw an episode of "Gomer Pyle, USMC." Don't ask and hopefully Gomer won't tell.)

While hosting "The Gong Show" in the late 1970s, Barris became increasingly jittery, sweaty, red-eyed, and paranoid. In 1981, he suffered a breakdown and holed up naked in a New York hotel room for several months.

All this was fairly close to standard operating procedure for entertainment industry weasels during the Great Hollywood Snowstorm. Barris, though, came up with a creative explanation for his career-ruining behavior.

While locked in his room growing a Howard Hughes beard, he typed his "Confessions." In them, he alleged that the reason he had grown so, uh, nervous was that he had a second career as a CIA assassin in which he had patriotically murdered 33 people. But now, elements within the Agency were after him.

Well ... sure, Chuck, anything you say! So, what does Hollywood's cleverest

screenwriter do with this material? Zip. He just plays it straight, as if Barris really was a game show host/hitman who would run into some understandable career difficulties combining his day job and night job.

Unfortunately, Kaufman—whose main interests appear to be show biz and pseudo-intellectualizing (in "Adaptation" he gave Charles Darwin a cameo to propound a laughably wrong version of what biologists mean by "adaptation")—cannot think of anything interesting to say about the CIA or the Cold War.

The spy scenes are so rote that they look like Kaufman's research consisted of watching a couple of John Le Carré spy movies. As Barris' spookmaster, Clooney delivers another imposing movie star performance, but as the Mata Hari spy, even Julia Roberts cannot create any excitement.

What could Kaufman have done instead? Lots. He could, for example, have made a culture clash comedy about Barris rotating between the highly Protestant CIA and the highly Jewish television business. (By the way, the FBI, as exemplified by Tom Hanks' Agent Hanratty in "Catch Me If You Can," was always quite Catholic.)

The CIA then believed Skull & Bones Yale men with trust funds were less of a

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security risk than Jews, who might have family or friends on the other side of the Iron Curtain. In return, countless Hollywood films stereotyped CIA higher-ups as thin-lipped, soulless, and incompetent WASPs. ■

Rated R for language, sexual content, and violence.
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BOOKS

[*The Survival of Culture: Permanent Values in a Virtual Age*, ed. Hilton Kramer and Roger Kimball, Ivan R. Dee, 256 pages]

Treason of the Intellectuals

By Roger Scruton

NAMED AFTER THE London-based journal founded and edited by T.S. Eliot, the *New Criterion* has for twenty years carried on a brave and much needed defense of our cultural and artistic inheritance. The journal was founded by Hilton Kramer and has been home to many of the most brilliant conservative intellects of our time, some of whom are represented in this latest collection of meditations. The battle over culture is the most important that we now have to fight and cannot be engaged in without serious analysis of what is actually happening in the worlds of art, literature, and scholarship. This analysis is what the *New Criterion* provides.

The Survival of Culture, edited by Kramer and his right-hand man, the indomitable Roger Kimball, consists of chapters taken from their journal. The theme is the fate of our cultural inheritance at the hands of those whose duty it is, on the conservative view, to transmit it. Thanks to political correctness, thanks to the rampant individualism that infects the educational system, and

thanks also to the "multicultural curriculum," which instills a universal vagueness and relativism, young people may be brought up knowing nothing of their culture. If you believe, as conservatives tend to believe, that a shared culture is a necessary ingredient in social harmony, you cannot welcome this.

American conservatives have reacted strongly to the liberal counterculture that has infected schools, universities, and the media. But we should recognize that political correctness and the multicultural curriculum are not confined to America. Half the contributors to this book are British or British colonials, and all of them have the same grim story to tell—the story, in a nutshell, of *le trahison des clercs*. Wherever you look among opinion-forming elites in the West, you find a "down with us" mentality, a desire to blame the evils of the modern world on the only political systems that have tried to rectify them, and a determination to undermine the institutions, habits, and laws that have made the Western world so dominant. Our universities are infected by a "culture of repudiation" by which the Western inheritance is systematically debunked, negated, or ridiculed in order to withhold it from the next generation—whose only reason for being at a university is to acquire it.

Writers in this book give many trenchant examples, and I suspect that few of our readers will need to be reminded of the worst of them. The prodigiously witty Mark Steyn brilliantly exposes the contradictions and self-refutations of the "down with us" mentality in a chapter that ought to be on every young person's reading list. As Steyn points out, the constant stirring up of guilt about the Western past—which is the dominant theme of the modern humanities—is really a kind of flight from the present, a way of proving your morality without the trouble of adopting it. And this habit of denigrating one's own culture has political consequences: "Bill Clinton has for years been too busy apologizing for the sins of his predecessors to apologize for any of his

own: 'I cannot tell a lie. My slave-owning predecessor George Washington did cut down that cherry tree.'"

The political scientist Ken Minogue tries more soberly to understand contemporary nihilism. According to Minogue, we live among the "new Epicureans," for whom individual choice is everything. People prove their worth by rejecting every role, custom, or authority whose credentials come from outside the self:

Each person seeks to detach himself from his particular character and situation in order to find a preferred location at the level of universal humanity. Particularity—being a schoolgirl and subject to rules, being pregnant and subject to restrictions, being homosexual and subject to suspicion when engaged in certain tasks—are all seen as forms of imprisonment incompatible with an open society. And the warders of this prison are the institutions that constitute society.

Minogue believes that we are experiencing a deep crisis of Western civilization, which is not to be cured by some legislative project, still less by any national or spiritual revival of the kind for which—I suspect—the majority of decent Americans are yearning. To this I would simply add that we are living through the current phase of the Enlightenment, unembellished by high culture or the memory of Christian virtue.

Other writers in *The Survival of Culture* focus on the tenured professors, who enjoy all the privileges of the academy in return for relentless debunking of the civilization that made this possible. Prominent among such establishment radicals is Edward Said, whose "cultural war on Western civilization" is exposed to withering criticism by Keith Windschuttle. Said's analysis of "orientalism"—the supposed disposition of the West to caricature other civilizations as "static," "exotic," and mired in ritual—has been a mainstay of cultural

criticism in our universities. Nowhere does Said explore how Arab and Muslim civilization has viewed the West, how Hinduism has viewed Islam, how Polynesian polytheism has been regarded in China, or Japanese Shintoism in Korea. By avoiding comparative judgments Said is able to overlook the virtues of Western culture—its openness to outside influence and tolerant endorsement not only of alternative traditions but also of posturing intellectuals like Said, who pretend not to belong to a civilization that pays all their cultural and material expenses.

Robert Bork discusses the Supreme Court and the subversive role that it has played in the hands of the liberal elite. The independence of the judiciary, one of the finest concepts of the original American settlement, is integral to a democratic constitution. But when the judges are chosen by a liberal elite, Bork persuasively argues, and when that elite stands in an adversarial relation to ordinary society, the result is a subversion of legal and moral norms. Bork is a martyr to the principles that he so ably defends, and conservatives should take heart from his example and prepare to defend the Constitution from its guardians.

I read all the chapters of this book with pleasure and agreement, and with only one small but persistent complaint, which is that the writers, in their understandable melancholy over what has been lost, do not pay enough attention to what remains. Genuine conservatives still play a part in Western culture. Modernist architecture may continue to disfigure our cities, but architects like Robert Adam in Britain and Alan Greenberg in America are successfully developing the classical alternative. Rock music may have invaded the mental space of the young, but it is being edged out by the new tonality of John Adams, John Corigliano, and their like, themselves making space, in their own crazy way, for the revival of serious classical music of the kind represented in Britain by Nicholas Maw. The skeptical Tom Wolfe and the conservative Saul Bellow still dominate American fiction, while

poets like Rosanna Warren, who belong firmly within the tradition that reaches back through Eliot and Pound to the symbolists, have a following among the almost young. In every sphere of cultural endeavor someone, somewhere, is both trying to keep our culture alive and either succeeding or mourning.

True, the subsidies go to the desecrators and the nihilists, and this is depressing. But it is in the nature of subsidies to gravitate to the things that least deserve them. That is the Devil's work. (Oddly, the Devil is never mentioned in this volume; nor, come to think of it, is his Great Adversary.) If the State controls the museums, you can be sure that, like the public schools, they will be gradually voided of their spiritual and intellectual significance. The way forward for conservatives is to privatize as much as they can of the national culture and to establish, in place of the culture of repudiation, a habit of affirmation, which will enable future generations to belong to their past. ■

Roger Scruton is a philosopher and former editor of the Salisbury Review (UK). His most recent book is The West and the Rest: Globalization and the Terrorist Threat.

[Multiculturalism and the Politics of Guilt: Toward a Secular Theocracy, Paul Edward Gottfried, University of Missouri Press, 158 pages]

The Politics of Atonement

By Thomas E. Woods Jr.

ALTHOUGH SOME HAVE made entire careers out of chronicling the genuflections to political correctness that take place as a matter of dreadfully predictable routine on nearly all American college campuses, Elizabethtown College professor Paul Gottfried, in *Multicultural-*

ism and the Politics of Guilt, is at pains to emphasize that such perversities differ from the official culture only in degree, not in kind. Certain opinions regarding immigration, race, homosexuality, and the like are no more welcome within corporate America or the media than they are in the universities; nearly as unwelcome are views of Christopher Columbus and of the Western tradition in general whose tone is not sufficiently penitential. Gottfried's book addresses multicultural ideology and its program: to fashion beliefs and behavior in conformity with the multicultural outlook on the world, which is one of victim and victimizer. It "requires its subjects to behave unnaturally, despising their ancestry and inherited morals and at least pretending to reach out for 'enrichment' to alien groups and to the practitioners of unconventional lifestyles." Both compensatory action and restrictions on speech and behavior are thought to be necessary in order to provide justice to designated victims, which include homosexuals, women, and racial minorities.

Conservatives frequently speak of the secularization of society, but Gottfried argues that the multicultural onslaught reveals something more at work. The multicultural version of liberalism with which we are now confronted differs from the scientific and technocratic liberalism of the Progressive Era in its distinctly religious veneer. This newer version readily adapts for its own use the theological terms and categories of liberal Protestantism.

Gottfried speaks of a Christianity that "recasts the narratives of the Fall, Christ's suffering, and the promise of redemption in socially fashionable terms." When a member of a designated oppressor group publicly divorces himself from his own civilization, race, or ancestors, he demonstrates "sanctified living in a world or society held to be reprobate." In this context, Gottfried refers to the work of religious scholar Philip Jenkins, who, citing the Matthew Shepard case of several years ago, finds overwhelmingly religious overtones in

the way that crime was treated. Shepard, the reader will almost certainly recall, was a homosexual man who was beaten to death by three men after having propositioned them in a bar. "The crime," Jenkins wrote, "was portrayed strictly in terms of martyrdom and Calvary, complete with the grotesque image of crucifixion on barbed wire. The rhetorical implications were hammered home repeatedly and unsubtly. We are all guilty for his death, we must purge such sins from ourselves and our communities, how thoroughly our whole culture is permeated by sin and ungodliness." Jenkins could therefore speak of an American public, "which mistakenly thinks of itself as secular but is actually imbued with biblical and apocalyptic assumptions."

Although Gottfried does not make this particular comparison, these doctrines help to account for the discrepancy in the media coverage of Shepard's case on the one hand and Jesse Dirkhising's on the other. Dirkhising was a 13-year-old boy who was systematically raped and tortured to death by two homosexuals. In April 2001, Andrew Sullivan noted that in the previous year, only one small article on the Dirkhising murder had appeared in a mainstream newspaper (the *Washington Post*), while the *New York Times*, *Boston Globe*, and *Los Angeles Times* had ignored it altogether. During the same period, however, the *New York Times*

had published some 45 articles on Shepard and the *Washington Post*, 28.

The Dirkhising case, since it does not fit into the established categories of victim and victimizer (homosexuals are supposed to be oppressed, not oppressors), has no role to play in the multicultural religion. The Shepard case, on the other hand, gives the anointed the opportunity to stand above the rest of society, proclaim themselves not as other men, and render judgment on their insensitive and reprobate brethren, whose bigotry and lack of enlightenment created the atmosphere in which "hate crimes" were inevitable. It also provides ammunition for the passage of the kind of socially intrusive legislation ("anti-discrimination" laws and the like) by which the multicultural regime expands its hold over civil society.


Gottfried's analysis of liberal Protestantism and its role in fortifying the multicultural ideology that fuels the managerial state is more than persuasive. Still, there is plenty of blame to go around. Although Gottfried acknowledges that the politics of guilt are making their way into Roman Catholicism as well, I think it is worth amplifying the point that the American Catholic hierarchy has not exactly been an unwilling participant in the multicultural feeding frenzy. The bishops are so fundamentally Leftist in orientation—even those who for some reason are routinely called "conservative" would have been

considered reprehensible by their pre-Vatican II counterparts—that they are naturally drawn both to multiculturalism and the politics of guilt. The current slate of bishops (who, regrettably, have only followed the example of the Pope himself) have engaged in ceaseless ceremonies of apology for the Church's past, solemnly owning up to the terrible truth that, yes, the Catholic Church has historically been neither liberal nor feminist. It can hardly be a surprise, given the present hierarchy, that the official Church is either silent about or positively complicit in allegations of Catholic inaction during the Holocaust.

The ideas that Gottfried describes hold what Antonio Gramsci called "cultural hegemony" over Western societies. A major indication that a particular set of ideas has attained such hegemony is that its language and concerns are adopted even by its putative opponents. Official conservatism has increasingly taken its cues from this multicultural Left, whether or not its spokesmen care to admit it (or indeed are fully conscious of it). Gottfried recalls what took place during one of the presidential debates when Bob Dole was asked about gay-rights legislation:

Instead of addressing the question posed by a woman Unitarian minister (and advocate of the legislation proposed), Dole went on to speak about the afflictions he had endured as a disabled veteran: "We've suffered discrimination in the disability community. There are 43 million of us. And I can recall cases where people would cross the street rather than meet someone in a wheelchair." Dole warned sternly that "we shouldn't discriminate—race, color, whatever, lifestyle, disability," before digressing with equally jumbled syntax into his views on foreign policy.

Thus the politics of atonement are by no means confined to the political Left. Gottfried points out that the Christian Coalition's Ralph Reed has publicly



"It's okay to mix peas and corn, but don't call it 'porn'."

regretted “the failure of American Christians to come to terms with either the Spanish Inquisition or the Holocaust.” Republican presidential hopeful Gary Bauer, likewise, made clear that when considering Supreme Court nominees he would exclude “first of all anyone who is a bigot.” “The bigotry that Bauer deplores,” writes Gottfried, “is exclusively the white Christian kind, seeing that the prejudice of minorities is now widely viewed as reactive.”

The international presence of multicultural ideology was nowhere more evident than in the hysteria that greeted Austria when right-wing populist Jörg Haider was admitted into the government. Haider, an opponent of immigration and a supporter of decentralization and (more or less) free-market economics, was portrayed as an intolerable and indeed terrifying threat to democracy. The European Community went to absurd lengths to isolate Austria until Haider at last resigned. That unrepentant Trotskyites and other Communists are to be found throughout European politics does not trouble such hysterics at all. But resurgent fascism is always around the corner. Beate Winkler, director of the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, speaking of the “dangerous phase” through which Europe appeared to be passing, warned of where such ominous trends as the emergence of Haider could lead: “It starts with discrimination, then comes exclusion, and it can go as far as the Holocaust.”

As in the Haider case, as Gottfried points out, the Left always claims to see an emergent fascism just over the horizon and decades of liberal gains constantly in jeopardy. The corollary is also true: most of what passes for modern conservatism appears to see nothing but victory. Although conservatism has been pretty well routed for at least the past two generations (even if we include the Reagan interlude), we still get one book after another on the triumph of conservatism, the death of liberalism, “why we’re winning,” and so on. Liberals, on the other hand, write books decrying alleged threats to feminism

(recall Susan Faludi’s *Backlash*), or to civil rights, or to the New Deal/Great Society welfare state, even though all of these things are as alive and well as ever, and in absolutely no danger of repeal or even modest reconsideration. Even the “Republican Revolution” of 1994, which neoconservatives considered a wonderful success, left the federal apparatus almost completely untouched and cultural issues like affirmative action and immigration not addressed at all.

Gottfried raises an interesting prospect toward the end of the book. In the short run, of course, the political Left clearly benefits from mass immigration, both in the votes it can win by outdoing the Republicans in promises of wealth redistribution, and because when this forced integration (which, in effect, is what mass immigration amounts to) inevitably produces animosity, Leftist bureaucrats and social workers are all too eager to increase their power and authority by imposing order on a chaos of their own creation. But what happens when non-Western immigration reaches a level beyond which it can still be controlled by a political elite that once welcomed it? Put bluntly, is a Muslim voting bloc likely to favor feminism and gay rights?

Gottfried’s analysis of the situation both in the United States and in Western Europe is devastating and brilliant, and in providing a precise analysis of what it is we are up against he has produced a book from which any authentic conservative would benefit. He also documents the unwillingness of what today passes for a conservative movement to do anything about this situation, apart from a few feeble criticisms of Leftist excesses. One can scarcely expect much more from people who positively welcome the mass immigration that helps to fuel multicultural ideology—even celebrating it as a triumph for the Enlightenment liberalism they pass off as conservatism. ■

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versity, is associate editor of the Latin Mass magazine and co-author of The Great Façade: Vatican II and the Regime of Novelty in the Roman Catholic Church (greatfacade.com).

[American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy, Andrew J. Bacevich, Harvard University Press, 320 pages]

The New Rome

By David C. Hendrickson

IN *AMERICAN EMPIRE*, Andrew Bacevich provides a beautifully crafted portrait of the last decade of security policy. A former Army officer, and now a professor of international relations at Boston University, Bacevich insists that America has become an empire and that nothing is to be gained from pretending otherwise. The publication of the book in the fall of 2002, after the Bush administration has “thrown off the mask,” makes his claim rather less startling than it would have been a few years back, when policy-makers deemed it prudent to avoid the avowal of imperial pretensions. But no matter. This is a brilliant tour of the interventions of the 1990s—in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Iraq—and it provides in addition a superb look at civil-military relations, a subject on which the author is understandably anxious. Bacevich asks all the right questions, even if some of the answers he offers are less than fully convincing.

Bacevich easily dispenses with the “conventional notion that American statecraft in the 1990s amounted to little more than confused and capricious improvisation.” In the Republican and Democratic administrations of the 1990s, there was a coherent strategy reflecting a broad “consensus regarding the inherent desirability of military power; a commitment to maintaining U.S. global military supremacy in perpe-

tuity; and support for maximizing the utility of U.S. military might by pursuing an ambitious, activist, agenda." Bacevich says this of the Clinton administration, and when one realizes that Bush has covered that bet and doubled it, it seems just that the author is on to something. The end to which these labors are directed is the creation and maintenance of an "open" international order that would enable "the processes of globalization to continue and the American people to reap its rewards." Central to the strategy "is a commitment to global openness—removing barriers that inhibit the movement of goods, capital, ideas, and people. Its ultimate objective is the creation of an open and integrated international order based on the principles of democratic capitalism, with the United States as the ultimate guarantor of order and enforcer of norms."

To make his case, Bacevich "proposes a reconciliation with a couple of patriot-heretics, whose long-discredited ideas anticipated the snares and pitfalls awaiting a democracy playing the role of a sole superpower": Charles Beard and William Appleman Williams. Both historians, he says, were dead wrong about the major foreign policy question of their day—what to do, respectively, about Nazism and Stalinism—but they nevertheless saw clearly the domestic underpinnings of foreign policy and placed deserved emphasis on the centrality of economic expansion and the open door in understanding the contours of American history. Above all, they understood the utility of what Williams termed the "grand illusion": "The charming belief that the United States could reap the rewards of empire without paying the costs of empire and without admitting that it was an empire."

That America suffers from various grand illusions is clear enough, but it is doubtful if the commitment to "openness" and ever expanding areas for exports and investments really provides the master key in explaining American policy. Clinton administration officials,

to be sure, often spoke in these terms, with the president justifying the Kosovo intervention with the comment, "if we're going to have a strong economic relationship that includes our ability to sell around the world, Europe has got to be a key. . . That's what this Kosovo thing is all about." Since Bacevich is at pains to show the evasions, hypocrisies, and surreal denial of the obvious that attends American policy, it is not clear why we should take such a statement at face value. Was the president saying what he really thought or only what he thought the people wanted to hear? Once one accepts, as Bacevich does, that prevarication is the coin of the realm, it is not easy to spot the occasions on which high officials slip up and blurt out the truth.

NEW TESTAMENT FUNDAMENTALISM, OVERLAID BY OLD TESTAMENT

RIGHTEOUSNESS, SUSTAINS THE CONVICTION OF THE UNITED STATES AS A NEW ROME, WHOSE MISSION IT IS TO PUNISH THE GUILTY.

In accounting for the growing militarization of American policy, the strategy of openness provides a necessary but not a sufficient explanation. Two other factors—one structural, the other cultural—are of equal if not greater importance. On the first score, it is still not fully registered how the collapse of the Soviet Union transformed the international system and removed previous prudential restraints on the exercise of U.S. military power. The anti-Bolshevik Revolution, and the disintegration of the Soviet state that followed, not only produced "intoxicating vapors" at home, it also created an unparalleled situation in which virtually every state on the planet was dependent in some fashion on the United States. Even a nation not infatuated with dreams of unlimited economic expansion would have been hard pressed not to take advantage of its newfound position, accompanied as it was by the discovery of a new way of war with "exchange ratios" that allowed us to apply force with few U.S. casualties and little domestic fallout. Bacevich is too

perceptive an analyst to ignore this structural change, but the point is given little emphasis in his overall explanation.

Alongside this systemic change there are an array of cultural or ideological factors that also deserve attention, and perhaps even pride of place, in accounting for American empire. Whereas Bacevich would emphasize how we calculate profit and loss, more important, I think, is how we add up right and wrong. The search for new markets and investment opportunities by avid corporations and 401(k) rentiers may explain most of America's global economic policy, but the infatuation with military power is owing to deeper, if misguided, conceptions of national role and purpose, akin to (and increasingly reinforced by) reli-

gious conviction. New Testament fundamentalism, overlaid by Old Testament righteousness, sustains the conviction of the United States as a new Rome, whose mission it is to punish the guilty, establish absolute security through overwhelming military dominance, and to revolutionize the domestic order of refractory states. That messianic and Manichean perspective makes us blind to the misgivings and fears of others, incapable of understanding how our way of war generates intense resentment and hatred, and as ready to misread enemy intentions as to view contemptibly the advice of friends. Its roots are cultural or "ideological," not economic.

On the "question that urgently demands attention"—"what sort of empire [Americans] intend theirs to be"—Bacevich is Lippmannesque in his advice: "Scaling imperial ambitions to fit imperial assets; balancing means and ends; distinguishing between minor annoyances and large threats and between the genuinely essential and the

merely desirable, ... navigating between the rocks of timidity and shoals of hubris, reconciling what is necessary with what is right." He rightly worries over the pattern of civil-military relations that developed in the 1990s and castigates as morally irresponsible the foreign policy combination of ambitious ultimatum and blistering aerial attack—an especially obnoxious policy when paired (as in Kosovo) with extreme skittishness in the employment of American ground forces and avowals of saintly humanitarian intentions. Bacevich also intimates, less persuasively, that openness itself is the culprit, though he never really calls for its rejection. The book's intention is not to prescribe a remedy but to persuade the reader that the patient does indeed require one.

There are two potential checks on empire, two different standards to which critics might rally in opposition to what our forefathers called "the military system." One is nationalist in orientation, the other internationalist. One would pull up the drawbridges against further immigration, introduce controls on the movement of goods and capital, and withdraw from America's principal alliances in Europe and Asia. The other would accept free commerce with most nations, and entangling alliances with some, as an inescapable and indeed desirable component of American policy today. It would acknowledge that the United States does have basic responsibilities in the maintenance of world order, an unavoidable consequence of great U.S. power and far-reaching interdependence. It would find the remedy for empire in international association, relying in part on the good sense of traditional friends and allies to restrain the war-like propensities of the United States. Seeking cooperation with others, and rejecting unilateralism, internationalist opponents of empire would not refuse succor from like-minded friends abroad, who also see clearly the danger of American military adventurism and want it subject to restraint.

Both courses are pacific in character and share a common belief that univer-


sal empire is a menace to our security and is contrary to the deepest traditions of the republic. Both, too, are conservative. One, however, looks to the tradition of national independence, the other to the experience of federal union for the historical and normative underpinnings of policy.

Of these two courses, the latter is a more constructive and effective check on empire than nationalism. Indeed, there is a certain quaintness, if not downright obfuscation, in posing the choice in the old "internationalist vs. isolationist" vein. The United States is too big and powerful, and the impact of past actions too pronounced, for it to avoid having a profound effect on the world. Given the brute fact of American power, nationalism, even if self-consciously insular, can be a spur to entanglement and a badge of imperialism.

In addition, the refusal to revolutionize forcibly the society of states, whether by expanding democracy, liberating oppressed minorities, or waging preventive war, is as closely identifiable with the internationalist tradition as with the isolationist. Once upon a time, in the not too distant past, internationalists gave a decent respect to the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states. They wanted a world made safe for diversity. Only in the last two decades did the doctrine take hold that it was

our solemn duty—"peaceably if we can, forcibly if we must"—to revolutionize the international system. The traditional view, predominant in American thinking in all the 19th century and most of the 20th, puts its faith in peaceful example, believing that to go abroad in search of monsters to destroy is totally inconsistent with "the sacred independence of nations" and America's distinctive mission. Paul Schroeder wrote recently in this journal that the "two fundamental principles of modern international relations" have been "the recognition of state independence, and the willing acceptance by most international actors of the necessity and benefits of international associations and their requirements and rules." "Independence and Union" happens also to have been the motto of 1776 and of many years beyond. The fundamental values then affirmed, which had a deep kinship with "the law of nature and of nations," are perfectly congruent with the principles so brilliantly captured by Schroeder. This country must re-learn its duty to respect these basic principles, and the sooner the better. ■

David C. Hendrickson is professor of political science at Colorado College. His latest book is Peace Pact: The Lost World of the American Founding, forthcoming from University Press of Kansas in March 2003.



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Lessons of History

This being the first month of the new year, I should be wishing you health, peace and prosperity, but I think a look back in history would be far more appropriate.

With the phony war heating up in Iraq, and North Korea playing nuclear poker, the prospects for 2003 seem pretty lousy, give or take a few thousand dead—perhaps hundreds of thousands if things really go wrong. Mind you, very few wars in history, if any, would have started had the leaders known in advance what they were getting into. I'll stick to the 20th century, the bloodiest ever, and the one that proved beyond doubt that the more our masters study the past, the less wise they become.

In January 1903, the world was at peace, and Britain ruled an empire where the sun never set. It was the sole superpower, capable of waging naval wars on many fronts, but the previous year had seen its army almost humbled by a rag-tag bunch of Boers, an intimation of decline.

The following year, Japan went to war with Russia and sank its entire fleet. The defeat brought on the first Russian revolution. In the greatest conflict up to that time, the Austrian empire did not envisage in 1914 that its aggressive line against Serbia would lead to not only the greatest bloodletting Europe had ever seen, but also to the fall of the dynasties, starting with the house of Habsburg. The Tsar did not take in the consequences of his disastrous mobilization in 1914, giving an opening for that nice guy Lenin to come to power and murder millions.

While the Russians mobilized, the Kaiser prepared to checkmate him by putting into effect an immense mobiliza-

tion operation involving the entire German railway system. It was meant to take German armies into Belgium, and Britain, being treaty-bound to defend the tiny country, declared war. Herr Hitler also miscalculated, believing that his conquest of Poland and France would force Britain to sue for peace. We know how he ended up. Once he was sure of an Axis victory, Benito Mussolini got into the conflict by invading Greece and finished up in a Milan piazza hanging by his tootsies.

FDR did not figure Japan would go to war over the American embargo on Japanese trade, nor did the militarists in the land of the Rising Sun understand that the Americans would quickly recover from Pearl Harbor.

I'M SURE BRAVE SAMURAI'S OF THE NEOCON, **ARMCHAIR WARRIOR** PERSUASION IN WASHINGTON **ARE EAGER TO FIGHT KIM JR. TO THE LAST SOUTH KOREAN.**

To put it bluntly, war, or even preparation for war, goes hand in hand with miscalculation and even disaster. Who would have ever thought that American military superiority would stumble in Vietnam or that the Soviet bear would leave Afghanistan with its tail between its legs? America became the *numero uno* superpower once Europe had ruined itself through war. It became the sole superpower once the Soviets were revealed to have no clothes in Afghanistan. But as someone wrote

recently, it is not a permanent appointment. As Andrew Alexander wrote, "If something nags you about the proposed attack on Iraq, do not be surprised. It is called history."

Having brushed up on my history, I look back to June 1950, where as a 13-year-old, fresh down from Lawrenceville for the summer, I heard that war had broken out in a far away place called Korea. My father's tanker business skyrocketed overnight, and he took the time to inform me that Korea was in a peninsula sandwiched between China, Japan, and the Soviet Union. I had never heard of the place, nor had most Americans, and in this we had something in common with Winston Churchill, who theatrically and untruthfully announced he had "never heard of the bloody place."

After three years and four million dead there was no peace treaty, just an

armistice. We flattened North Korea's dams, factories, and cities, and napalmed its forests. They killed as many people as they could lay their hands on. "Korea no longer matters," muttered Churchill, back in power but going senile.

Fifty years later Korea matters more than ever. The DMZ, where two million soldiers face each other, is the last Cold War frontier. When Kim Il Sung invaded the South in 1950—yet another invasion that backfired terribly—the North

and South Koreans resembled each other. No longer. The ones from the south are now taller and heftier than their starved northern brothers. South Korea has gone from a terribly poor, Third World agrarian country to a global economic power, whereas North Korea is a Spartan state that practices an "army first" policy, its citizens starving and poorer than they were half a century ago.


Kim, of course, is rich in other matters. What Kim Jr. has is the world's largest concentration of tubed artillery with chemical shells targeted on Seoul's ten million souls. He also has a couple of nukes that can reach Japan. So despite Donald Rumsfeld's bellicose rhetoric against Kim Jr., this is the kind of nasty customer one doesn't want to get into a fight with. Kim Jong is no Saddam. He is not about to let anyone in to inspect him, doesn't give a hoot how many of his people starve to death or are killed in battle, and will launch his deadly missiles on the South the minute he smells a rat.

Although I'm sure brave samurais of the neocon, armchair warrior persuasion in Washington are eager to fight Kim Jr. to the last South Korean, the latter are not at all convinced. In fact, they insist on dialogue, and for some strange reason I see their point. What is to be done? I can only tell you what I hope happens. America has rightly declared that it will offer no new bribes to induce Kim to shut down his nukes. Our only chance of seeing the Sparta of the East go softly into the night is if the regime collapses. My hope is that in the next ten years — the time it will take for Kim to advance his nuclear capability — he will implode.

Don't forget 1945. The West faced the same challenge back then in the Cold War with Stalin's Russia. Then, hawks in the Pentagon tried to persuade President Truman to strike the Soviet Union before a tyrant like Stalin could get The Bomb. My father and many of his friends were of the same opinion. We had seen communism from up close and knew better. Still, Truman decided that trying to preserve America's nuclear monopoly was not worth killing millions of innocent Russians. It took a further 45 years of vigilance, but the evil empire did implode, just as so many had predicted it would. Despite their genocidal tendencies, Stalin and Mao played the brinkmanship game cautiously, even prudently. They knew they would fry if push came to shove.

The lesson of the Cold War was that a free, rich West could afford to face down poor, evil regimes over time. The risk now is that American hawks will prevail, and that Uncle Sam will lash out at Iraq in impotent fury at North Korea's defiance and capacity to deter the Pentagon from attack. North Korea just might not sit tight while American armies are knocking out Iraq. A million-strong North Korean army could invade the South.

Fifty years ago the West was led by men who had seen war up close. No longer. The oil Washington will gain from defeating Saddam will seem small if a nuclear war shatters the two Koreas and Japan. As Paul Robinson wrote in the London *Spectator*, "To defend our wealth and privilege, we feel entitled to inflict death and destruction on others to protect ourselves against the merest risk of a risk." Hear, hear! Neocon warriors, relax. You have nothing to lose but a few million Koreans. ■




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